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Abstract
Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining
how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action
be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman’s, says it is. For
on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing inten-
tions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of
minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to
joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different
kind of joint action, an account compatible with the premise about
development. The new account is no replacement for the leading
account; rather the accounts characterise two kinds of joint ac-
tion. Where the kind of joint characterised by the leading account
involves shared intentions, the new account characterises a kind of
joint action involving shared goals.
Keywords: Joint action, shared intention, plural activity, cognitive
development, action
Word count: 9600 (plus 1200 words in reference list)
1. The Question
On the assumption that joint action plays some role in explaining how
humans develop an understanding of minds, what could joint action be?
This question needs a little background. It is quite widely agreed that
human adults’ reﬂections on thoughts and actions, their own and oth-
ers’, involve a range of commonsense psychological concepts including
belief, desire, intention, knowledge and perception. Children’s abilities
to deploy these concepts improve in ﬂuency and sophistication over more
than three years (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman 1995). Several psychologists
have claimed that children ﬁrst engage in joint action from around their
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ﬁrst birthday and that engaging in joint action facilitates these early im-
provements (Moll & Tomasello 2007; Tomasello & Carpenter 2007;
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll 2005; Tomasello & Rakoczy
2003). Joint actions that young children engage in include tidying up
the toys together (Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello 2005), cooperatively
pulling handles in sequence to make a dog-puppet sing (Brownell, Ra-
mani & Zerwas 2006), bouncing a ball on a large trampoline together
(Tomasello & Carpenter 2007) and pretending to row a boat together.
The psychologists claim that engaging in joint actions like these plays
some role in the early development of abilities to use concepts like be-
lief, desire, intention, knowledge and perception, and in the development
of higher forms of cognition more generally. My question is what joint
action could be given that some version of this claim is true.
The question arises because a leading account of joint action, Michael
Bratman’s, is incompatible with the premise. To anticipate what is ex-
plained in detail below, on the leading account engaging in joint action
requires sharing intentions, and sharing intentions requires abilities to
engage in reasoning about propositional attitudes—reasoning of just the
sort whose development was supposed to be explained by engaging in
joint action. So if the leading account were the whole truth about joint
action, engaging in joint action would presuppose, and therefore could
not explain, much of the development of reasoning about others’ men-
tal states. Given that the premise is true, the leading account cannot be
the whole truth about joint action. We need a further account of joint
action, one that is compatible with the premise that joint action plays
a role in explaining how humans develop abilities to think about minds
and actions. Sections 4–8 provide such an account. Before that, Section
2 outlines the leading account of joint action and Section 3 explains why
this account is incompatible with the premise about development.
2. What is joint action? The leading account
Philosophers’ paradigm cases of joint action include painting the house
together (Michael Bratman), lifting a heavy sofa together (David Velle-
man), preparing a hollandaise sauce together (John Searle), going to
Chicago together (Christopher Kutz), and walking together (Margaret
Gilbert). One aim of an account of joint action is to identify features of
some or all of these cases in virtue of which they count as joint actions.
In this paper I focus on Michael Bratman’s account because, despite the
clarity of its presentation, no decisive objection to the parts of his account
outlined below has yet been published, and also because this account has
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been most inﬂuential in psychology.1
Bratman characterises a kind of joint action he calls ‘shared inten-
tional activity’, which is activity explainable by shared intention.2 This
immediately leads to the question of what shared intentions are. Brat-
man’s answer has two parts, a speciﬁcation of the functional role shared
intentions play and a substantial account of what shared intentions could
be. On the ﬁrst part, Bratman stipulates that the functional role of shared
intentions is to:
(i) coordinate activities; (ii) coordinate planning; and (iii)
provide a framework to structure bargaining (Bratman 1993,
p. 99).
To illustrate: if we share an intention that we cook dinner, this shared
intention will (iii) structure bargaining insofar as we may need to decide
what to cook or how to cook it on the assumption that we are cooking
it together; the shared intention will also require us to (ii) coordinate
our planning by each bringing complementary ingredients and tools, and
to (i) coordinate our activities by preparing the ingredients in the right
order.
Given this claim about what shared intentions are for, Bratman ar-
gues that the following three conditions are collectively sufﬁcient3 for
you and I to have a shared intention that we J. This is his substantial
account of what shared intentions could be:
“1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J
“2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la,
lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend that we J in
accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans
of la and lb
“3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us” (Bratman
1993, p. View 4)
In arguing that these are collectively sufﬁcient conditions for shared in-
tention, Bratman combines two strategies. He argues that these condi-
tions collectively sufﬁce to rule out certain cases where, intuitively, there
1 Other notable contributions not discussed in this paper due to lack of space in-
clude Searle (2002), Gilbert (2006), Tuomela (1995), Sugden (2000), Gold & Sug-
den (2007a), Kutz (2000) and Roth (2004).
2 Bratman (1997, p. 142). See Bratman (1992, pp. 338-9) for further details on the
relation between shared intentions and shared intentional activities.
3 In Bratman (1993), the following were offered as jointly sufﬁcient and individually
necessary conditions; the retreat to sufﬁcient conditions occurs in Bratman (1997,
pp. 143-4) where he notes that “for all that I have said, shared intention might be
multiply realizable.”
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is no shared intention (such as the case where we each intend to paint
the house, I yellow and you blue). And he argues that the attitudes spec-
iﬁed in these conditions are collectively capable of playing the three roles
shared intentions are supposed to play.
3. Why shared intentional activity could not signiﬁcantly
foster an understanding of minds
Suppose that joint action plays a role in explaining the early development
of children’s abilities to think about minds. Is Michael Bratman’s shared
intentional activity a notion of joint action which could play this role?
Several psychologists have suggested that it is. Thus Moll and Tomasello
explicate their hypothesis that ‘the unique aspects of human cognition…
were driven by, or even constituted by social cooperation’ (2007, p. 3) by
appeal to ‘a modiﬁed version of Bratman’s (1992) deﬁnition of “shared
cooperative activities” … [on which] the participants in the cooperative
activity share a joint goal’ (2007, p. 3); in this context ‘share a joint goal’
means ‘possess a shared intention’. Similarly, Carpenter, in a discussion
of joint action in infancy, writes:
‘I will … adopt Bratman’s (1992) inﬂuential formulation of
joint action … [F]or an activity to be considered shared or
joint each partner needs to intend to perform the joint ac-
tion together ‘‘in accordance with and because of meshing
subplans’’ (p. 338) and this needs to be common knowledge
between the participants.’ (Carpenter 2009, p. 281)
Others who appeal to Bratman’s notion of shared intentional activity in
characterising children’s ﬁrst joint actions and their role in development
include Tomasello et al. (2005, p. 680) and Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpen-
ter & Tomasello (2009, p. 1430).
Recall that shared intentional activity requires shared intentions. On
Bratman’s substantial account, sharing intentions requires having inten-
tions about intentions and even intentions about subplans of intentions
(see Condition 2 in the quote on the preceding page). Bratman empha-
sises this feature of the account:
“each agent does not just intend that the group perform the
[…] joint action. Rather, each agent intends as well that the
group perform this joint action in accordance with subplans
(of the intentions in favor of the joint action) that mesh”
(Bratman 1992, p. 332).
A natural thought at this point is that joint action might require only
plans which in fact mesh rather than intentions about the meshing of
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plans. Bratman considers this option and explains why this weakening
of his account is not coherent (Bratman 1992, pp. 331-3), so I shall not
pursue this thought.
The fact that shared intentions require intentions about intentions
suggests a potential objection to the view that shared intentional activity
explains early developments in children’s abilities to think about minds.
For it seems unlikely that 2- and 3-year-olds, who according to many
ﬁndings are years away from being able to ascribe any propositional at-
titudes at all,4 can form intentions about others’ intentions.5 This would
mean they cannot meet the sufﬁcient conditions Bratman lays out for
sharing intentions.
This potential objection is weak because it depends on controversial
empirical claims about the absolute time in development at which abil-
ities to ascribe, and to form intentions about, intentions might emerge.
A more promising objection avoids this dependence. The ability to form
intentions about intentions involves a sophisticated kind of propositional
attitude ascription (as explained below). This ability is required for shar-
ing intentions in accordance with Bratman’s substantial account. So
meeting the sufﬁcient conditions for joint action given by this account
could not signiﬁcantly explain the development of an understanding of
minds because it already presupposes too much sophistication in the use
of psychological concepts.6
Note that, as it stands, this objection does not establish much. It con-
cerns conditions imposed by the substantial account of shared intention
4 The most widely discussed propositional attitude has been belief; see (Wellman,
Cross & Watson 2001; Wimmer & Perner 1983) but also (Baillargeon, Scott & He
2010; Kovács, Téglás & Endress 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Surian, Caldi
& Sperber 2007). Apperly and Butterﬁll (Apperly & Butterﬁll 2009) argue for the
possibility that while children in their ﬁrst and second year have abilities to track
beliefs, they cannot ascribe beliefs or other propositional attitudes as such.
5 There is evidence that children of this age have difﬁculty understanding intentions
(Astington 1991; Astington & Gopnik 1991). A range of researchers have argued
that infants form expectations about goal-directed activity (Csibra 2008; Gergely,
Nadasky, Csibra & Biro 1995; Woodward 1998; Woodward & Sommerville 2000).
It may be that the understanding of goal-directed activity examined by these studies
falls short of an understanding of intention.
6 A related objection may apply to Claire Hughes’ appeal to “reciprocal exchanges”.
She speciﬁes that such exchanges “depend on … modelling the other’s inten-
tions/desires (i.e. reﬂecting on the other’s inner states) and monitoring the others’
understanding of one’s own intentions and desires (i.e. detecting mistaken beliefs
about one’s own inner states)” (Hughes, Fujisawa, Ensor, Lecce & Marﬂeet 2006,
p. 56). Thus engaging in reciprocal exchanges appears to require ﬂuid and sophisti-
cated ascriptions of mental states. Accordingly, engaging in such exchanges cannot
signiﬁcantly explain how children develop abilities to think about minds.
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which are sufﬁcient but not necessary conditions.7 The substantial ac-
count is supposed to characterise one—perhaps one among many—ways
in which the functional role of shared intentions can be realised. So
the objection serves only to raise a question. Are there in fact alterna-
tive sufﬁcient conditions for shared intention, conditions that can be met
without already having abilities to use psychological concepts whose de-
velopment was supposed to be explained by joint action?
The answer to this question is not entirely straightforward. We must
begin with the functional roles of shared intention, for these provide nec-
essary conditions. One of the roles of shared intentions is to coordinate
planning. What does coordinating planning involve? Intuitively the idea
is that just as individual intentions serve to coordinate an individual’s
planning over time, so shared intentions coordinate planning between
agents. (I use the terms ‘individual intention’ and ‘individual goal’ to
refer to intentions and goals explanatory of individual actions; an ‘in-
dividual action’ is an action performed by just one agent such as that
described by the sentence ‘Ayesha repaired the puncture all by herself’.)
A second role for shared intentions is to structure bargaining concern-
ing plans. To understand these roles it is essential to understand what
‘planning’ means in this context. The term ‘planning’ is sometimes used
quite broadly to encompass processes involved in low-level control over
the execution of sequences of movements, as is often required for ma-
nipulating objects manually (e.g. Haggard 1998), as well as processes
controlling the movements of a limb on a single trajectory (e.g. Bizzu
2001). In Bratman’s account and this paper, the term ‘planning’ is used
in a narrower sense. Planning in this narrow sense exists to coordinate
an agent’s various activities over relatively long intervals of time; it in-
volves practical reasoning and forming intentions which may themselves
require further planning, generating a hierachy of plans and subplans.
Paradigm cases include planning a birthday party or planning to move
house.
Given the functional roles of shared intention, when (if ever) must
the states which realise shared intentions include intentions about oth-
ers’ intentions? Coordinating plans with others does not seem always or
in principle to require speciﬁc intentions about others’ intentions. It is
7 Tollefsen (2005) objects to Bratman’s account of shared intention on the grounds
that it requires common knowledge. This objection also fails because common
knowledge is explicitly required by what I am calling Bratman’s substantial account
only, which gives sufﬁcient but not necessary conditions for shared intention. (A
second potential problem for Tollefsen’s argument is that it requires the premise
that young children engage in joint actions of the kind Bratman’s account aims to
characterise, the kind whose paradigms involve coordinating potentially long-term
plans.)
6
plausible that in everyday life some of our plans are coordinated largely
thanks to a background of shared preferences, habits and conventions.
Consider, for example, people who often meet in a set place at a ﬁxed
time of day to discuss research over lunch. These people can coordi-
nate their lunch plans merely by setting a date and following established
routine; providing nothing unexpected happens, they seem not to need
intentions about each other’s intentions. Within limits, then, coordi-
nating plans may not always require intentions about intentions. The
same may hold for structuring bargaining. But when the background
of shared preferences, habits and conventions is not sufﬁcient to en-
sure that our plans will be coordinated, it is necessary to monitor or
manipulate others’ plans. And since intentions are the basic elements
of plans (in the special sense of ‘plan’ in terms of which Bratman de-
ﬁned shared intention), this means monitoring or manipulating others’
intentions. The background which makes for effortlessly coordinated
planning is absent when our aims are sufﬁciently novel, when the cir-
cumstances sufﬁciently unusual (as in many emergencies), and when our
co-actors are sufﬁciently unfamiliar. In all of these cases, coordinating
plans and structuring bargaining will involve monitoring or manipulat-
ing others’ intentions. Now this does not necessarily involve forming
intentions about their intentions because, in principle, monitoring and
manipulating others’ intentions could (within limits) be achieved by rep-
resenting states which serve as proxies for intentions rather than by rep-
resenting intentions as such, much as one can (within limits) monitor
and manipulate others’ visual perceptions by representing their lines of
sight. But possession of general abilities to monitor and manipulate oth-
ers’ intentions does require being able to form intentions about others’
intentions.
The question was whether there are sufﬁcient conditions for shared
intention which do not presuppose abilities to use psychological con-
cepts whose development is supposed to be explained by joint action.
As promised, the answer is not straightforward. In a limited range of
cases, coordinating plans and perhaps structuring bargaining does not
appear to require insights into other minds. But in other cases, partic-
ularly cases involving novel aims or agents unfamiliar with each other,
intentions about others’ intentions are generally required.
The main question for this section was whether Bratman’s account
captures a notion of joint action suitable for explaining the early devel-
opment of children’s abilities to think about minds. Some of the joint
actions which young children engage in involve novel aims, and some
involve unfamiliar partners. So if these joint actions did involve coor-
dinating planning and structuring bargaining, they could not rest on a
shared background but would require abilities to form intentions about
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others’ intentions. It follows that joint action would presuppose much
of the sophistication in the use of psychological concepts whose develop-
ment it was supposed to explain. So given the premise that joint action
plays a role in explaining early developments in understanding minds, it
cannot be the case that the joint actions children engage in as soon as they
engage in any joint actions involve shared intentions as characterised by
Bratman.
This conclusion rests on the assumption that having intentions about
intentions involves some of the psychological sophisticationwhose devel-
opment is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. One might
object that the ability for form intentions about intentions is somehow
less sophisticated than abilities to form other kinds of representation of
other kinds of mental states. To answer the objection it is sufﬁcient to
clarify what ‘intention’ means in this context. For the term ‘intention’,
like ‘planning’, is used to mean different things by different researchers.
Sometimes ‘intention’ and ‘goal’ are used interchangeably in describing
behaviour which is somewhat ﬂexibly organised around some outcome
(e.g. Premack 1990, p. 14). But in this context we need a different notion
of intention, one on which intentions are elements of plans. Such inten-
tions play a role in coordinating an agent’s activities over time. Their role
is characterised in part by normative constraints expressed in terms of
the propositional contents of intentions. For instance, one norm char-
acteristic of the role of intentions in plans requires an agent to avoid
ways of realising one intention that will make it impossible for her to
realise other intentions she has (all things being equal). This norm re-
quires someone who intends both to visit an aunt and to buy some shoes
in a single evening to limit time spent on each activity to allow for the
other. Another norm characteristic of intention concerns the compati-
bility of having multiple intentions simultaneously: it is not rational to
have multiple intentions unless it is rational to have a single intention
agglomerating them all (Bratman 1987). Norms such as these, together
with the role of intentions in practical reasoning, are what characterise
the role of intentions in planning. Given that intentions are characterised
in this way as elements in plans, it seems necessary that understanding
intentions will involve some grasp both of the role that intentions as
propositional attitudes play in practical reasoning and also of the norms
relating intentions to planning. Of course this does not mean that indi-
viduals who understand intentions as elements in plans can articulate or
list the relevant roles or norms. But it does mean that they should some-
times be sensitive to some of the requirements these norms impose and
also that they would be able to recognise some of the norms as correct
in optimal conditions. This is why requiring intentions about intentions
presupposes signiﬁcant psychological sophistication.
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Given that joint action facilitates the development of mental under-
standing, and that (as just argued) Bratman’s notion of shared intentional
activity is not a kind of joint action which could play this role, does it
follow that Bratman’s account is incorrect?8 Drawing this conclusion
would require the further assumption that there is just one kind of joint
action. This is not obviously true. Compare individual action. It is
sometimes accepted that there is a distinction between intentional action
and other kinds of action such as response behaviours and merely pur-
posive activities (Dickinson & Balleine 2000; Frankfurt 1971). Because
there may be an analogous distinction between kinds of joint action, the
developmental considerations do not directly bear on the correctness of
Bratman’s account. Perhaps what we need is not a modiﬁed version of
Bratman’s account but an account of a different kind of joint action.
To sum up, Bratman’s account does not characterise a kind of joint
action which could play a role in explaining how children come to un-
derstand minds. In the next section I consider whether this undermines
the claim that the interactions highlighted by developmental psycholo-
gists are really joint actions before offering a new account of joint action
in the following sections.
4. Joint action, shared intention and coordinated planning
The argument of the previous section establishes that not all of the fol-
lowing claims are true:
(1) joint action fosters an understanding of minds;
(2) all joint action involves shared intention; and
(3) a function of shared intention is to coordinate two or
more agents’ plans.
These claims are inconsistent because if the second and third were both
true, abilities to engage in joint action would presuppose, and so could
not signiﬁcantly foster, an understanding of minds. For all that has been
said so far, any of these claims could be rejected. In what follows I char-
acterise a form of joint action which involves what I call ‘shared goals’
and no shared intentions. The aim is to show by construction that there
are forms of joint action which require minimal cognitive sophistication.
In doing this I shall provide grounds for rejecting the claim that joint
8 Tollefsen (2005) argues that Bratman’s account of joint action is incorrect on the
grounds that children engage in joint action but not in shared intentional activity as
characterised by Bratman. The considerations below identify a missing premise in
her argument.
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action always involves shared intention, (2), strengthening the case for
accepting the premise about development, (1), while remaining neutral
on whether shared intentions function to coordinate planning, (3).
Some researchers assert that all joint actions involve shared inten-
tions. For instance, Tomasello writes that ‘[t]he sine qua non of collab-
orative action is a joint goal and a joint commitment’ (2008, p. 181).
Here ‘joint goal’ refers to shared intention in Bratman’s sense and ‘col-
laborative action’ includes joint actions early in development. Similarly,
Gilbert writes ‘I take collective action to involve a collective intention’
(2006, p. 5). Perhaps, then, a better strategy than the one I propose
would be to reject the ﬁrst claim, (1), above and conjecture that joint
action cannot signiﬁcantly foster an understanding of minds (although
some lesser form of interaction may do so). But it is striking that none of
the researchers who assert that all joint action involves shared intention
provide an argument, and narrowly semantic considerations provide no
support for this assertion (Ludwig 2007; Smith 2011, p. 367). In fact
other researchers have assumed without argument that not all joint ac-
tions involve shared intention (Bratman 1992, p. 330; Schmidt, Fitz-
patrick, Caron & Mergeche 2010, p. 2010; Vesper, Butterﬁll, Knoblich
& Sebanz 2010). On what grounds could we accept this assumption or
its negation?
Let us step back. What features other than shared intention indicate
that the actions of two or more agents constitute a joint action as op-
posed to any other kind of interaction? Here are several indicators of
joint action:
i. this case seems to ﬁt with paradigm examples of joint ac-
tion such as walking, cooking or playing the piano together
(Gilbert 1990; Goebl & Palmer 2009; Velleman 2000);
ii. the candidate joint action differs from a case in which
the agents perform the same type of activity (such as walking
or cooking) in parallel rather than together (Bratman 2009;
Gilbert 1990; Gräfenhain et al. 2009, p. 150);
iii. for each agent, acting together rather than individually is
voluntary in this sense: in so far as they control which means
they adopt in pursuing a goal, such as whether to move an
object by lifting it or by dragging it, they can also control
whether their actions are individual or joint;
iv. there is a sense in which all of the agents’ actions taken
together are directed to a single goal, and this is not just a
matter of each agent’s action being individually directed to
that goal;
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v. there is a description of the interactionwith a plural subject
and an action verb, such as ‘they are bouncing the ball on the
trampoline’ (Kutz 2000 emphasises this indicator);
vi. each agent is disposed to modify her actions in accordance
with what is needed to achieve the goal given how the other
agents’ actions are unfolding (Bratman 1992, p. 328).
I am not suggesting that any of these features is necessary for joint action,
nor that they are collectively sufﬁcient. My claim is just these features
are relevant to deciding whether an interaction is a joint action, and that
where an interaction has many or all of these features we have (defea-
sible) grounds to infer that it is a joint action. In short, I propose that,
in the absence of a deeper analysis, we should take these features as a
rough and provisional explication of one theoretically signiﬁcant way of
using the term ‘joint action’.9
So what about the objection that all joint action involves shared in-
tention? The following will provide (defeasible) grounds for rejecting it.
For I shall show that some interactions have the features listed above,
(i)-(vi), but do not involve shared intention.
5. Plural activities
Our question is what joint action could be on the assumption that it fos-
ters an understanding of minds. We have seen (in Section 3) that the
answer cannot involve appeal to shared intention. Joint actions involv-
ing shared intention presuppose, and so cannot signiﬁcantly foster the
development of, sophisticated uses of psychological concepts. What we
need, then, is to identify a form of joint action that requires as little psy-
chological sophistication as possible; by presupposing less we make it
possible to explain more.
I shall approach this task indirectly by ﬁrst considering forms of ac-
tion involving multiple agents more basic than any kind of joint action.
Some ants harvest plant hair and fungus in order to build traps to cap-
ture large insects; once captured, many worker ants sting the large in-
sects, transport them and carve them up (Dejean, Solano, Ayroles, Cor-
bara & Orivel 2005). The ants’ behaviours have an interesting feature
distinct from their being coordinated: each ant’s behaviours are individ-
ually organised around an outcome—the ﬂy’s death—which occurs as
9 There may be other notions of joint action. For instance, Ludwig asserts that “[t]he
concept of a joint action as such is just that of an event of which there are multiple
agents” (2007, p. 366). As he notes, it is a straightforward consequence of this view
that if there are joint actions then there are joint actions without shared intentions.
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a common effect of many ants’ behaviours. We can say that there is a
single activity—killing a ﬂy—which several ants performed. In general,
a plural activity is one involving two or more agents. As I shall use the
term ‘plural activity’, for agents to be engaged in a plural activity it is
sufﬁcient that each agent’s activities are individually organised around a
single outcome which occurs as a common effect of all the agents’ activ-
ities.
Note that nothing controversial is assumed in stating these sufﬁcient
conditions for plural activity. The ﬁrst ingredient is the notion that an
individual’s behaviours can be organised around an outcome. This is
shorthand for an open-ended disjunction of cases; it means that there
is an intention, habit, biological function or other behaviour-organizing
circumstance connecting the individual’s behaviours to the outcome. The
second ingredient is the notion of a common effect, which is not speciﬁc
to action. The ﬂy’s capture is a common effect of the ants’ individual
behaviours in just the sense that the ﬂy’s death is a common effect of the
multiple doses of poison it received: none of the doses was individually
deadly, each had its murderous effect only in concert with some of the
others. As characterised here, the notion of a plural activity depends on
nothing more controversial than the cogency of these two ingredients.
My use of the term ‘plural activity’ is different from other natural
uses of this term and may be too broad to pick out an intuitive category.
If Helen and Ayesha individually aim to smooth a section of pavement by
shufﬂing their feet when they walk over it and if it does become smooth
partly as a consequence of both their efforts, then they are engaged in
the plural activity of smoothing the pavement. This is true even in the
absence of any intention to act together. It is true even if their lives do
not overlap at all, so that there may be no intuitive sense in which their
smoothing the pavement is a joint action. Allowing this case to count as
a plural activity does no harm for present purposes and makes it possible
to characterise a useful notion of plural activity in uncontroversial terms.
Another potentially unnatural feature of this deﬁnition of plural ac-
tivity is that it requires success. By deﬁnition, where two or more agents’
actions constitute a plural activity the outcome to which they are directed
must occur. This simpliﬁes the deﬁnition in ways that will shortly be use-
ful.
Humans sometimes perform activities that are plural in the mini-
mal sense that some ants’ behaviours are. In a particularly sulky mood
Thomas pulls on one end of a large boat in order to move it; he does not
realise that Illaria is pushing the other end and that without her contri-
bution the boat would not move. He succeeds in moving the boat, as
does Illaria. So there is a single activity—moving the boat—which they
both perform. Even though Thomas’ action is goal-directed (its goal is
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to move the boat to the sea), his activity is plural only in the minimal
sense that the ants’ ﬂy-trapping behaviour is: it is organised around an
outcome which occurs as a common effect. The plural nature of such
activities need not show up in intentions, desires or beliefs. That an ac-
tivity is performed by two individuals does not require that they intend,
believe or desire this to be so.
What most philosophers mean by joint action is not, or not only,
this minimal notion of plural activity. Certainly this minimal notion is
inadequate for our present purpose, which is to understand what joint
action could be on the assumption that it plays some role in explaining
how children come to understand minds. Nevertheless, the notion of
plural activity is a useful starting point for understanding a kind of joint
action relevant to explaining development.
6. What is the function of shared goals?
In giving an account of one kind of joint action I shall ﬁrst identify some-
thing I call ‘shared goals’. Before starting it will be helpful to ﬁx termi-
nology. As I use the term ‘goal’ it refers to an outcome, actual or pos-
sible, and not to a state. I make no direct use of the notion that agents
can have goals (as in ‘Sam’s goal was to topple the president’) and fo-
cus on relations between goals and actions (as in ‘the goal of Marvin’s
action was to upset Ayesha’). An action is goal-directed where it makes
sense to ask which of its possible and actual outcomes are goals to which
the action was directed. One paradigm case of goal-directed action in-
volves intention: where an agent acts on an intention, the intention’s
content speciﬁes a goal to which her action is directed. In addition, an
action can arguably be directed to a goal which is not speciﬁed in the
content of any of the agent’s intentions (Bratman 1984). There may also
be forms of action which are goal-directed but do not involve intention
at all.10 Certainly there are ways of representing actions as goal-directed
which do not involve representing intentions or any other propositional
attitudes of agents.
The term ‘shared’ is used loosely. Just as, on most accounts, shared
intentions are neither literally intentions nor literally shared (no single
intention is mine and yours), so shared goals are not goals (they are
complexes of states and relations) and do not by deﬁnition alone involve
anything which is literally shared. I have used the otherwise infelicitous
label ‘shared goal’ in order to highlight the basic intuition behind the
positive account of joint action I shall offer: some cases of joint action
10 This is suggested by Velleman’s (2000, pp. 10-30) discussion of ‘purposeful activity’.
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involve structures which bind not the agents’ intentions but the goals to
which their activities are directed.11
Having ﬁxed terminology we can now turn to the primary issue,
which is to identify shared goals. Following the model provided by Brat-
man’s account of shared intentions, my account of shared goals has two
parts: a speciﬁcation of their function role and a substantial description
of states that could realise them. This section is about the functional
role of shared goals, the following section concerns their realisation. To
emphasise, questions about the mental states involved in sharing goals
will be deferred until the next section; in this section the question is only
what shared goals are for.
Successful plural activity generally requires coordination. How is
this coordination achieved? In the case of ants such coordination may
be achieved hormonally. In humans, who can voluntarily engage in
plural activities with novel outcomes, coordination can usually only be
achieved psychologically. This is what shared goals are for. Shared goals
coordinate multiple agents’ goal-directed activities around an outcome
to be achieved as a common effect of their efforts. That is, their function
is to coordinate plural activities.
An illustration may help to clarify what performing this function
amounts to. There is a fallen tree lying across the road. Several peo-
ple each want it moved, but none of them can move it by themselves and
none of them can control the others’ actions. The tree’s movement can
only be secured as common effect of several people’s actions. In this situ-
ation, there is a need for several people to coordinate their goal-directed
activities. They need to lift in complementary directions and at suitably
related times; and if lifting doesn’t work, they need to change strategy
and try pushing or something else that might achieve the outcome. The
role of shared goals is to coordinate these goal-directed activities.
In the above illustration, plural activity is necessary to achieve an
outcome. Shared goals also play a role in situations where plural activity
occurs even though it is not necessary. For instance, Amin and Bertram
each individually aim to put a large barrel into a boat. Either of them
could move the barrel into the boat alone or their doing this could be
a plural activity; the choice is theirs. The sequence of activities Amin
would need to perform to put the barrel in the boat differs depending on
whether he is acting alone or with Bertram. Acting alone, Amin would
position himself so that the barrel and boat are in front of him, throw
his arms around the middle of barrel, raise it, tilt back and then push up
11 This intuition provides a loose connection between the notion of shared goals and
Miller’s notion of a collective end (Miller 2001). While it would be useful to discuss
differences and similarities in substance and motivation, there is no space to do that
here.
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and forwards. If he chose to act with Bertram, Amin would need to take
an entirely different approach. It is this need that shared goals answer.
The notion that a function of shared goals is to coordinate goal-
directed activities needs qualifying because all action involves coordi-
nation at several levels. Any goal-directed action, individual or joint,
will be realised by a collection of simple object-directed actions such as
pushing, pulling and tearing; and these in turn will be realized by some
kind of motor actions, and so on until at some point we reach continuous
bodily movements. Plainly most tasks require coordination at several of
these levels; for instance, passing an object from one hand to another
requires precise timing of releases and grasps as well as appropriate po-
sitioning in space. At some levels, coordination is largely independent of
which goals agents’ actions are directed to (for example, it can be hard to
use one’s hands in an uncoordinated way even when doing so would be
advantageous). This is true even for coordination of multiple agents’ ac-
tivities. We may coordinate with others without being aware of how we
are coordinating or even that we are coordinating (Richardson, Camp-
bell & Schmidt 2009). In fact there seem to be several forms of emergent
coordination, that is, coordination which is independent of the goals of
an agent’s actions (Knoblich, Butterﬁll & Sebanz 2010). Clearly, then,
shared goals are not the only factor in coordinating plural activity. The
role of shared goals is limited to coordinating goal-directed actions and
not their non-purposive components, and it may be that shared goals
can play this role only thanks to the existence of other mechanisms of
emergent coordination.
Shared goals resemble shared intentions insofar as both exist to co-
ordinate activities. They differ in that structuring bargaining and co-
ordinating planning are not functions of shared goals. On some views,
the distinction I have drawn between shared intentions and shared goals
parallels a distinction between individual intentions and more primitive
states connecting individuals’ activities with the goals to which they are
directed. For individual intentions are sometimes held to be intrinsi-
cally elements in agents’ plans and therefore absent from the lives of
any agents incapable of planning (Bratman 2007). Such agents (if there
are any) may need to act when faced with equally desirable alternatives
and to coordinate their activities around goals despite ﬂuctuations in de-
sire. This need might be met by states which resemble intentions in that
they exist in part to coordinate a single agent’s activities and in that they
connect the agent’s activities to a goal, but differ from intentions in lack-
ing planning functions. Given this distinction, shared intentions would
stand to shared goals roughly as individual intentions stand to their more
primitive counterparts.
The limited function of shared goals makes them better suited than
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shared intentions for characterising the cases studied in developmental
research. Many, perhaps all, of these cases would not normally require
coordinated planning. As mentioned above, these cases include tidying
up the toys together and cooperatively pulling handles in sequence in
order to make a puppet sing. As coordinated planning is not needed in
such cases, nor are shared intentions. What is needed, though, is for
the agents’ goal-directed actions to be coordinated. This is what shared
goals are for.
7. Which states could realise shared goals?
In the previous section I identiﬁed shared goals in terms of their function,
which is to coordinate plural activities. The next step is to characterise
states capable of realising this function.
To start with an illustration, suppose that a goal of Amin’s actions in
the near future will be move a large barrel into a boat. Amin anticipates
that some of Bertram’s future actions will have the same goal, and Amin
expects the barrel’s moving into the boat to occur as a common effect of
his own goal-directed actions and Bertram’s. For his part, moving the
barrel into the boat will also be a goal of Bertram’s actions and Bertram
has expectations mirroring Amin’s. In favourable circumstances their
goal-directed contributions to a plural activity of moving the barrel into
the boat could be coordinated in virtue of this pattern of goal-relations
and expectations. Accordingly, the existence of such goal-relations and
expectations are sufﬁcient for Amin and Bertram to share the goal of
getting the barrel into the boat.
Here are the key features of this case expressed in general terms:
(a) one goal, two or more agents—
there is a single goal, G, to which each agent’s actions are, or
will be, individually directed;
(b) identiﬁcation—
each agent can identify each of the other agents in a way that
doesn’t depend on knowledge of the goal or actions directed
to it;
(c) expectations about goal-directed actions—
on balance12 each agent expects each of the other agents she
can identify to perform an action directed to the goal; and
12 The ‘on balance’ qualiﬁcation in conditions (c) and (d) rules out cases where agents
do have the speciﬁed expectations about goals and outcomes but also have further,
conﬂicting expectations which outweigh them.
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(d) expectations about a common effect—
on balance each agent expects this goal to occur as a common
effect of all of their actions directed to the goal, her own and
the others’.
In favourable circumstances and in concert with emergent coordination,
these goal-relations and expectations could serve to coordinate the goal-
directed plural activities of two or more agents (I shall say which cir-
cumstances are favourable below). Since ‘shared goal’ was deﬁned in
terms of this coordinating function, (a)-(d) are collectively sufﬁcient for
possessing a shared goal.
Let us consider these four features in turn. The ﬁrst feature, (a), is
required just because we are concerned with plural activities; by deﬁ-
nition, actions comprising a plural activity are directed to a single goal
such as moving a particular barrel onto a certain boat (see Section 4).
The second feature, (b), was not explicit in the description of Amin and
Bertram’s barrel moving. It excludes the following sort of case. Mia and
Sobani are in a crowded space. Each intends to move a table and, thanks
to her background knowledge, expects that exactly one other agent in-
tends the same. But neither Mia nor Sobani can identify who else she
expects to be involved in moving the table, except trivially as the other
table-mover. In this case, the pattern of goal-relations and expectations
in (a), (c) and (d) could have at most a limited effect onMia and Sobani’s
ability to coordinate their efforts. So the identiﬁcation requirement, (b),
is included because the coordinating effect of (a), (c) and (d) seem to de-
pend on it. Identiﬁcation may not feature whenever agents have a shared
goal; (a)-(d) collectively provide only sufﬁcient conditions.
The third and fourth features, (c) and (d), involve expectations. Knowl-
edge states and beliefs both count as expectations but it is not necessary
to have either. In developmental research, looking times and eye move-
ments are regularly used as measures of infants’ expectations concerning
goals (for example Csibra, Bíró, Koós & Gergely 2003; Gergely & Csi-
bra 2003; Gergely et al. 1995; Luo & Baillargeon 2005; Woodward &
Sommerville 2000). It is an open question whether these sorts of expec-
tations are beliefs. Where such expectations do not merely control look-
ing times and eye movements but also inform a range of goal-directed
actions in ways that are rational given their contents, then expectations
of this type are sufﬁcient for sharing goals whether or not they amount
to beliefs. This marks one contrast between requirements on sharing
goals and sharing intentions. Given that intentions function to coordi-
nate planning in Bratman’s intellectual sense of planning and given some
plausible norms governing the rationality of planning (Hawthorne 2004,
pp. 29-31), sharing an intention will require knowledge of others’ inten-
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tions and their relations to one’s own. By contrast, sharing a goal does
not require knowledge. because several kinds of expectation which fall
short of knowledge are sufﬁcient for coordinating plural activities.
The third feature, (c), concerns expectations about other agents’ goal-
directed actions. This is a minimal counterpart of the requirement that
agents who share an intention represent each other’s intentions. Pos-
sessing a shared goal requires representing only goal-directed actions. It
is possible to represent an action as goal-directed without representing
(or even being able to represent) intentions or any other propositional
attitudes. For instance, an agent might represent goals as functions of
actions.13 There are strong theoretical and empirical grounds to hold
that representing goal-directed actions requires less conceptual sophisti-
cation, and may be less cognitively demanding, than representing inten-
tions as such.
The fourth feature, (d), concerns the agents’ expectations that the
goal to which their actions are directed will occur as a common effect of
their efforts. This and the third feature are jointly equivalent to requiring
that the each agent expects that she and the other agents are engaged in
a plural activity with goal G. (The agents may not actually be engaged
in a single plural activity because, as noted earlier, plural activities are
by deﬁnition successful whereas it is possible to possesses a shared goal
without succeeding.) The claim that features (a)-(d) are sufﬁcient for
agents to possess a shared goal is the claim that this combination of
features could function to coordinate plural activities. In essence, the
claim is this: an expectation, on the part of each agent concerned, that
she is or will be involved in a plural activity with the others, will, in
favourable circumstances and in concert with emergent coordination,
normally enable them to coordinate their actions.
Shared intention is sometimes thought to involve common knowl-
edge in such a way that agents who share an intention can know that
they share an intention.14 By contrast, it is possible to have a shared
goal without knowing that one does. Agents can have, and act on (see
Section 8 below), a shared goal without understanding their actions as
comprising anything more than a plural activity.
13 On goals as functions of actions see, for example, Wright (Wright 1976) and Price
(Price 2001). A variety of research supports the claim that young children, non-
human primates and corvids track the functions of things (including Rakoczy and
Tomasello 2007; Casler and Kelemen 2007; Csibra and Gergely 2007; Kelemen
1999; German and Defeyter 2000; Hauser 1997; Emery and Clayton 2004). On
the abilities of these groups to represent goals speciﬁcally, see further footnote 5 on
page 5.
14 This view is endorsed by Bratman (1993, p. 103) and rejected by Ludwig (2007, pp.
387-8).
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The above pattern of goal-relations and expectations, (a)-(d), can
play its coordinating role only in favourable circumstances. What makes
circumstances unfavourable? One factor is a lack of freedom. To il-
lustrate, suppose that Hendrik and Arch are instructed to tidy the toys
away. Arch would not normally obey this instruction but Hendrik con-
vincingly threatens reprisals unless Arch tidies all the toys away. For the
goal of tidying the toys away, (a)-(d) above could all obtain in this case
(Hendrik fulﬁls (a) by the act of threatening). But any coordinating effect
this pattern of goal-relations and expectations might have had is trumped
by Hendrik’s control over Arch’s actions. Arch’s lack of freedom is an
unfavourable circumstance, that is, one in which the coordinating role
of shared goals may be blocked. Another unfavourable circumstance is
antagonism to plural activity. Suppose that Ella and Cohen have been
tasked with wiping a table clean. Ella is desperate to clean the table
without Cohen, and Cohen is desperate to clean it without Ella. Neither
thinks this will be possible, and they satisfy (a)-(d) above. But because
they are desperate to act alone, each tries to sabotage the other’s efforts.
Any coordinating effect the shared goal might have had is overridden by
the agents’ antagonism to plural activity. In short, then, favourable cir-
cumstances are those in which factors that would defeat the coordinating
tendency of the pattern of goal-relations and expectations in (a)-(d) are
absent; paradigm defeating factors are a lack of freedom and antagonism
towards plural activity.
8. Shared goals characterise one form of joint action
So far I have stipulated that the function of shared goals is to coordinate
plural activities and argued that this function could be realised by a cer-
tain pattern of goal-relations and expectations. Finally I shall use this
to characterise a form of joint action which, lacking the cognitive and
conceptual demands associated with shared intentional action, could be
used to explicate the premise that engaging in joint action fosters an un-
derstanding of minds.
Shared goals are characteristic of a form of joint action but the rela-
tion between possession of a shared goal and performing a joint action is
not straightforward. Compare ordinary individual action. Acting inten-
tionally is not just a matter of acting and simultaneously intending; nor is
it even just a matter of being caused to act by an intention (Searle 1983,
pp. 136-7). Relatedly, we should not suppose that the mere presence, or
even the mere efﬁcacy, of a shared goal is sufﬁcient for joint action. Take
any collection of actions directed to a single goal, G, involving two or
more agents. Let us say that these actions, taken collectively, are driven
19
by a shared goal when G is a shared goal of the agents, when, in per-
forming actions directed to this goal, they are acting on the associated
expectations and any other attitudes in ways that are rational, and when
their so acting functions to coordinate their actions in a way that would
normally facilitate the goal’s occurring as a common effect of all their
efforts. (I assume that, although the expectations mentioned in Section
7 may not be necessary for possessing a shared goal, some such expec-
tations are always involved.) I claim that actions driven by shared goals
are joint actions.
Why accept this? Recall the six indicators of joint action identiﬁed
earlier (Section 4). Where these three conditions hold of an interaction,
most of these indicators will be present. The interaction will be distinct
from a case in which the agents pursue the goal in parallel and with-
out a shared goal (this was the second indicator). The action will be
voluntary with respect to its jointness insofar as jointness is partly due
to agents acting on their expectations in ways that are rational, as con-
trasted with interactions where coordination involves only involuntary
forms of emergent coordination (third indicator). If the goal occurs, this
will normally be in part because of the coordination provided by the
shared goal; in this sense, the coordination serves to direct the agents’
actions, taken together, to the goal and this amounts to more than each
agent’s actions being individually directed to the goal (fourth indicator).
Finally, the agents’ dispositions to adapt their actions to each other’s is
built into the requirement that the shared goal function to coordinate
their actions by means of their acting on the associated expectations
(sixth indicator). In short, actions driven by shared goals have many
features indicative of joint action. This is reason to hold that they are in
fact joint actions.
Not every case in which actions are driven by shared goals ﬁts intu-
itively with paradigm examples of joint action. Consider two drivers on
a collision course in a narrow street. Suppose (perhaps unrealistically)
that each acts with the goal of avoiding a collision between their cars, ex-
pects the other to do the same and expects that they will avoid collision
thanks to their combined efforts. This is sufﬁcient for avoiding a colli-
sion to be a shared goal. (Note that specifying the goal requires care: the
drivers’ actions would have different goals if, for instance, the only goal
of each driver’s action were to avoid hitting the other.) Suppose also that
their actions are driven by a shared goal in the sense deﬁned above. So,
on the above account, their avoiding collision is a joint action. (Not all
cases of avoiding a collision are joint actions, only those, if any, which
are driven by shared goals.) But intuitively this case may not seem to
ﬁt with paradigms of joint action because the interaction is so minor. If
this counts as joint action, then, given the right goal-relations and ex-
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pectations, so could passing someone in a corridor. Should we modify
the account of joint action in order to exclude this sort of case? There
is an obstacle to doing that. We could elaborate a series of interactions
driven by the shared goal of avoiding collision where each interaction
is slightly less minor than its predecessor in the series. Whether or not
intuitions support drawing a boundary, it seems that no such boundary
is theoretically signiﬁcant for understanding the role of joint action in
development. Since our aim is to characterise joint action as it fosters
development, we should risk deviating from intuition to avoid otherwise
unnecessary complexity.
There is another sort of case in which actions driven by a shared goal
may not intuitively ﬁt with paradigm joint actions. Consider again the
two drivers whose goal is to avoid collision. Now suppose, in addition,
that the ﬁrst driver hawkishly accelerates while covertly preparing to
brake if necessary, causing the second driver to brake hard. Given the
present account, their actions nevertheless constitute joint action. This
may not ﬁt intuitively with paradigm joint actions because the ﬁrst driver
dominates the second (and does so by means of deception).15 Again it is
possible to elaborate a series of cases involving gradually varying degrees
of domination. While outright coercion is incompatible with joint action
on the account I have offered (see Section 7 above), neither domination
nor other failures to be cooperative are excluded. This may conﬂict with
intuitions about joint action but reduces the complexity of the account.
That the account is nevertheless an account of joint action is shown by
the presence of the other indicators of joint action mentioned above.
Accounts of joint action sometimes invoke special kinds of mental
state (Gilbert 1992; Searle 2002), special kinds of reasoning (Gold &
Sugden 2007a), special kinds of interdependence (Bratman 1993; Miller
2001) or, apparently, special kinds of agent (Helm 2008). The present
account, if successful, shows that there is a simple kind of joint ac-
tion characterising which requires no such special ingredients. The sim-
ple kind of joint action involves only ordinary individual goal directed-
actions being coordinated in part by expectations about others’ goal-
directed actions and their common effects.
There are, of course, questions and puzzles about joint action which
the simple account offered here does not address and which may call
for greater complexity. These include issues about commitment (Gilbert
2006), the coordination of decisions to act jointly (Velleman 1997), the
15 This example is can be modelled as a Hawk-Dove game and is adapted from a dis-
cussion of Gold and Sugden (Gold & Sugden 2007b, pp. 304-8). As these authors
note, the combination of actions is not a rational consequence of team reasoning
(Sugden 2000, on team reasoning see) and so does not involve the associated notion
of group agency (Gold & Sugden 2007a).
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kind of reasoning needed for coordinating choices (Sugden 2000), and
the possibilities of intending others’ actions (Searle 2002, 1994) and of
acting on others’ intentions (Roth 2004). Failure to address these ques-
tions or tackle these puzzles might be an objection if the simple account
were meant to be the whole story about joint action. In fact the sim-
ple account is not supposed to apply to every case of joint action. For
instance, painting a house together will probably involve intentionally
coordinating plans and so require sharing intentions rather than merely
sharing goals. On the other hand, in some cases joint action does not
require planning, commitment, coordinating decisions to act or special
kinds of reasoning. Knoblich and Sebanz offer an example:
“theway people lift a two-handled basket depends onwhether
they lift it alone or together. When alone, a person would
normally grasp each handle with one hand. When together,
one person would normally grasp the left handle with his/her
right hand and the other person would grasp the right handle
with his/her left hand.” (Knoblich & Sebanz 2008, p. 2026)
Because handles provide an obvious way for two people to lift the basket
(these authors even postulate a joint affordance) and people are often
skilled at coordinated lifting, planning is typically unnecessary and it is
plausible that shared goals are sufﬁcient for joint actions of this sort.16
9. Conclusion
The question was this. Given the premise that joint action plays some
role in explaining how children come to understand minds, what could
joint action be? The negative point was that it couldn’t involve shar-
ing intentions for reasons connected to the fact that sharing intentions
involves coordinating planning and so requires sophistication in ascrib-
ing propositional attitudes. The positive claim was that there is a sim-
ple account of joint action which is compatible with the developmental
premise. On the simple account, joint action involves sharing goals and
sharing goals requires only an understanding of goal-directed actions and
their common effects.
This simple account of joint action is not offered as a replacement for
Bratman’s account or any accounts competing with his. Bratman’s ac-
16 Knoblich and Sebanz claim that lifting the basket together requires “joint intention-
ality” which in turn requires shared intentions in roughly Bratman’s sense: “[t]here
needs to be an intentional structure that allows an actor to relate his/her own inten-
tion and the other’s intention to an intention that drives the joint activity” (2008, p.
2025). I reject this claim for the reasons given above.
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count assumes that joint action involves shared intention where the func-
tions of shared intention include coordinating paradigmatically long-
term plans. Such an account may be required to characterise complex
cases where success demands that agents’ plans mesh. But some cases
of joint action (such as carrying a two-handled basket together) do not
involve plans in the relevant sense of planning. The agents need to co-
ordinate their activities but not their plans. The simple account applies
only in such cases. In philosophical accounts of individual action, ac-
tions explainable by intending are sometimes distinguished from other
kinds of individual action including response behaviours, arrational ac-
tions andmerely purposive activities (Dickinson& Balleine 1993; Hurst-
house 1991; Velleman 2000). Comparable distinctions are certain to be
needed for understanding joint action; the differences between shared
intentions and shared goals mark one such distinction between kinds of
joint action.
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